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Humenansky v. Regents of the University of 
Minnesota: Questioning Congressional Intent and 
Authority to Abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
Immunity with the ADEA 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial 
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State.”1 Although the Supreme 
Court has expanded the scope of Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity far beyond the boundaries of the amendment’s actual text,2 
state immunity from suits brought by private citizens in fed-
eral court is not absolute. One limitation to Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity arises from the power of Congress to enforce 
equal protection rights.3 Congress may abrogate the states’ 
immunity through legislation.4 To do so, however, it must (1) 
provide within the language of the statute an “unmistakably 
clear” statement of its intent to revoke state immunity to 
claims arising under that legislation, and (2) properly enact the 
immunity-abrogating statute pursuant to its authority to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment.5 
Seven federal circuits have concluded that Congress prop-
erly manifested its intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 2. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). 
 3.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 5 states, “The Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” Id. Another 
limitation to Eleventh Amendment immunity is a State’s ability to waive its immunity 
by enacting state legislation or by participating in a particular federal program. See 
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). In addition, the Eleventh 
Amendment does not prohibit federal court actions brought to enjoin the enforcement 
of an unconstitutional statute by a State official. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 
159-60 (1908). 
 4. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241-43. 
 5. Id. at 242-43. 
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Amendment immunity when it amended the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (“ADEA” or “Age Act”)6 to include the 
states within the definition of potentially liable employers.7 
Conversely, a minority of circuits have held that the language 
of the Age Act does not contain an effective expression of con-
gressional intent.8 In Humenansky v. Regents of the University 
of Minnesota, for example, the Eighth Circuit held that the 
ADEA fails to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in part be-
cause the statute does not contain a plain statement of intent 
in any single section within the text, nor a direct reference to 
the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity.9 
The circuit split over whether Congress properly manifested 
its intent to abrogate state immunity is a product of the courts’ 
diverging interpretations of the “unmistakably clear” require-
ment referred to above and originally set forth in Atascadero 
State Hospital v. Scanlon.10 This Note will attempt to clarify 
the Atascadero standard for expressing congressional intent by 
analyzing the Humenansky decision. Part II will review the 
history of the Eleventh Amendment, noting several landmark 
cases that have expanded or restricted the scope of the 
amendment during the last two centuries. Part II will also pro-
vide a brief introduction to the ADEA. Part III will summarize 
the facts of the Humenansky case and the court’s conclusions. 
Part IV will analyze the Humenansky decision as it relates to 
the intent requirement for Eleventh Amendment abrogation. 
By examining the language of the ADEA in light of several 
statutes that have previously been held by the Supreme Court 
to possess sufficient or insufficient manifestations of congres-
sional intent, this section will provide a framework for analyz-
ing statutory language that purports to deprive the states of 
their immunity. This part will also demonstrate that, in light of 
 
 6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-30 (1994). 
 7. See Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1998); Keeton v. 
University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998); Hurd v. Pittsburg State 
Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1997); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 
F.3d 690, 695 (3d Cir. 1996); Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Servs., 
945 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1991); Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th 
Cir. 1990); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 701 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 8. See Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 
824-25 (8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 
98-1235); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. 
granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999). 
 9. See id. at 824-25. 
 10. See Atascadero State Hosp. V. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985). 
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this multi-statute comparison, the ADEA does in fact possess a 
sufficiently clear expression of intent to abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity to ADEA suits. Section B of 
Part IV will demonstrate that the ADEA also meets the second 
prong of the Eleventh Amendment abrogation test—it was en-
acted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.11 Finally, Part 
V will conclude that the Supreme Court, if faced with the issue, 
should reject the Humenansky court’s position on both the au-
thority and intent issues and hold that the ADEA does effec-
tively abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Evolution of Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
1.  Inception of the Eleventh Amendment 
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted in response to the 
1793 Supreme Court decision, Chisholm v. Georgia.12 In Chis-
holm, a South Carolina citizen, acting as executor for a de-
ceased South Carolina citizen, sued the State of Georgia for the 
value of military supplies which the deceased had sold to the 
State.13 Georgia challenged the Supreme Court’s original juris-
diction over suits between a state and citizens of another 
state,14 but the Court held that states were subject to the Su-
preme Court’s original jurisdiction under both Article III, sec-
tion 2 of the Constitution,15 and the Judiciary Act of 1789.16 
 
 11. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996). The Court recog-
nized that “the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Elev-
enth Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-
existing balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Elev-
enth Amendment.” Id. The fact that the Eleventh Amendment may be abrogated 
through Fourteenth Amendment legislation does not justify limiting the Eleventh 
Amendment on the basis of constitutional provisions that predate the Eleventh 
Amendment. See id. 
 12. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 13. See id. at 420. 
 14. See id. at 419. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This section provides in relevant part: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising un-
der this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, . . . to Controversies to 
which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or 
more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—[and] between 
Citizens of different States . . . . 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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Within two days of the Chisholm decision, a resolution, now 
codified as the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, was 
introduced in the House of Representatives.17 The proposal 
provided that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”18 
2.  Supreme Court expansion of the Eleventh Amendment 
Almost a century later, the Supreme Court first expanded 
the scope of the Eleventh Amendment.19 In Hans v. Louisiana, 
a Louisiana citizen sued the State of Louisiana for damages 
arising out of a contract for the sale of state-issued bonds.20 
Reasoning that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to em-
body the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity that ex-
isted at the time the Constitution was ratified, the Court held 
that the Eleventh Amendment is not limited to the scope of its 
actual text.21 The Court extended the amendment to preclude 
suits brought against a state by its own citizens, regardless of 
whether the claim originated under federal or state law.22 
3.  Exceptions to the Supreme Court’s expanded interpretation of 
sovereign immunity 
Following Hans, however, the Supreme Court constricted 
the scope of sovereign immunity by carving out several excep-
tions to the Court’s previously broad interpretation of the Elev-
enth Amendment. As a result, the Eleventh Amendment no 
longer precludes suits for prospective relief against state offi-
cials acting in violation of federal law.23 In Ex parte Young, 
shareholders of various railroads sued the State of Minnesota 
 
 16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789) (repealed 1948). 
 17. See Kenneth S. Weitzman, Comment, Copyright and Patent Clause of the 
Constitution: Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment 
Sovereign Immunity After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
297, 302 n.17 (1991). 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 19. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. at 12-15. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). 
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in federal court, alleging that state legislation regulating rail-
road rates was confiscatory and violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.24 The Court held, 
If the act which the state . . . seeks to enforce [is] a violation of 
the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such 
enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of 
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official 
or representative character and is subjected in his person to 
the consequences of his individual conduct.  The State has no 
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to 
the supreme authority of the United States.25 
The Supreme Court has also held that states may waive 
their immunity by consenting to federal jurisdiction,26 and, as 
will be shown, states are no longer protected from suits by pri-
vate citizens in federal court where Congress manifests an in-
tent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment while legislating 
pursuant to its constitutional powers.27 
4.  Restricting congressional authority to abrogate state 
immunity 
In 1985, the Eleventh Amendment pendulum swung again 
in favor of the states when the Supreme Court made it more 
difficult for Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.28 
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon involved a plaintiff whose 
application for employment was rejected by a state hospital.29 
The applicant sued under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, alleg-
ing that the hospital discriminated against him by refusing to 
hire him because of his disabilities.30 The hospital moved for 
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred the federal court from jurisdiction over the 
claim.31 Granting the state hospital’s motion, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress could not abrogate the states’ immu-
nity unless it manifested “its intention to abrogate the Elev-
 
 24. See id. at 123-26. 
 25. Id. at 159-60. 
 26. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 235 (1985); Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17 (1890). 
 27. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
 28. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 278. 
 29. See id. at 236. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
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enth Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute it-
self.”32 
In 1996, the Supreme Court further limited congressional 
abrogation power by holding, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, that 
Eleventh Amendment immunity may be nullified only through 
Fourteenth Amendment legislation.33 In an earlier decision, the 
Supreme Court had taken a broader view of Congress’s author-
ity to circumvent sovereign immunity.  Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas involved a suit by the United States against a fuel plant to 
recover money that the United States had paid to reimburse a 
state government for expenses incurred in the cleanup of haz-
ardous waste generated by the defendant’s facility.34 The fuel 
company filed a third-party suit against the state, asserting 
that the state was liable as an owner and operator of the con-
taminated site under CERCLA.35 A divided court rejected the 
state’s motion for dismissal, and held that Congress may strip 
the states of their Eleventh Amendment immunity through ei-
ther Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment legislation.36 
But this expansion of congressional power was short-lived. 
The Court later overruled Union Gas in Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida,37 a case involving an Indian tribe suit against the State of 
Florida under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.38 This Act al-
lows Indian gaming activities to be conducted if performed pur-
suant to a valid compact between the tribe and the state in 
which the gaming activities take place.39 Under the Act, the 
states have a duty to negotiate such a compact with a tribe.40 If 
a state fails to negotiate in good faith, a tribe may sue in fed-
eral court in order to compel state cooperation.41 
The Seminole Tribe sought to compel negotiations under 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,42 but Florida claimed that 
the suit should be dismissed on Eleventh Amendment 
 
 32.  Id. at 243. 
 33. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-66 (1996). 
 34. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. at 23. 
 37. 517 U.S. at 71-74. 
 38. See id. at 47-51. 
 39. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1994). 
 40. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
 41. See  25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7). 
 42. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51. 
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grounds.43 The Supreme Court agreed with Florida, holding 
that “the Eleventh Amendment prevent[s] Congress from au-
thorizing suits by Indian tribes against States . . . to enforce 
legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.”44 
More importantly, the Court held that Congress lacks the au-
thority to abrogate state immunity through any Commerce 
Clause legislation—leaving the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
only source of congressional abrogation power.45 In reaching 
this conclusion, the Seminole Court noted that Article III—
which prohibits federal court suits by private citizens against 
the states—is ordinarily the “exclusive catalog of permissible 
federal-court jurisdiction.”46 Although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment “operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state 
and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh 
Amendment,” the Eleventh Amendment cannot be limited by 
“antecedent provisions of the Constitution,” such as the Com-
merce Clause.47 
5.  The Fourteenth Amendment and further constriction of 
congressional power to abrogate state immunity 
In City of Boerne v. Flores,48 the Court further narrowed 
congressional abrogation power by articulating a more restric-
tive interpretation of Congress’s authority to enact Fourteenth 
Amendment legislation.49 The Fourteenth Amendment provides 
in relevant part that no state shall “deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”50 The Amend-
ment further states that “Congress shall have power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”51 City 
of Boerne v. Flores arose when a Catholic parish sued the local 
government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1997 (RFRA) after the City of Boerne denied the church a per-
mit to build additional worship space.52 In Boerne, the Supreme 
 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. at 53, 76. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 65. 
 47. Id. at 65-66. 
 48. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 49. See id. at 519-29. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 51. Id. § 5. 
 52. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507. 
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Court addressed the issue of whether Congress had exceeded 
the scope of its Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 enforcement 
power in enacting the RFRA.53 The RFRA prohibited the gov-
ernment from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of re-
ligion unless the government could show that the burden “(1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest.”54 
The Court held that the “compelling government interest” and 
“least restrictive means” test was too restrictive of government 
action and created substantive rights not recognized by the 
Constitution.55 Congress has the power to enact remedial stat-
utes in order to protect against Equal Protection Clause viola-
tions, but it does not have the power “to determine as a matter 
of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within 
the ambit” of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 The Supreme 
Court considered the RFRA to be “so out of proportion to a sup-
posed remedial or preventive object” that it could not “be un-
derstood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitu-
tional behavior.”57 Therefore, the RFRA could not have been 
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.58  
The Boerne decision did not directly focus on Eleventh 
Amendment issues. Nevertheless, the decision will likely have 
a substantial impact on the future of Eleventh Amendment ju-
risprudence because it limited the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—the only source of congressional power to abro-
gate Eleventh Amendment immunity.59 
B.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
1.  Purpose of the ADEA 
In studies conducted during the 1960s, Congress found that 
older workers were finding it increasingly difficult to retain 
employment and regain employment after being terminated.60 
 
 53. See id. 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994). 
 55. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509. 
 56. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
 57. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 509. 
 58. See id. at 512-17. 
 59. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71-74 (1996). 
 60. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 
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Congress also found that “the setting of arbitrary age limits . . . 
[had] become a common practice.”61 The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act62 was enacted in 1967 “to promote employ-
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than age” 
and “to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination” by employers.63 
The  ADEA prohibits employers from “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to 
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual’s age[.]”64 The statute provides that a court may enforce 
the Act by granting legal or equitable relief “as may be appro-
priate to effectuate the purposes of this chapter, including 
without limitation judgments compelling employment, rein-
statement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts 
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime com-
pensation under” the Act.65 
2.  ADEA claims against state employers 
 Originally, the ADEA’s definition of “employer” only in-
cluded private entities, and specifically excluded state employ-
ers.66 The 1967 statute provided: “The term ‘employer’ means a 
person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 
twenty-five or more employees . . . but such term does not in-
clude the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the 
Government of the United States, or a State or political subdi-
vision thereof.”67 
In 1974, however, Congress amended the Act to eliminate 
the language excluding states from ADEA suits, and to include 
the states within the employer definition.68 Specifically, the Act 
now provides that the class of employers against whom ADEA 
actions may be brought includes, among others, “a State or po-
 
Stat. 602 (1967). 
 61. Id. 
 62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-30 (1994). 
 63. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2(b), 81 
Stat. 602 (1967). 
 64. 29 U.S.C § 623(a)(1). 
 65. Id. § 626(b). 
 66. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 11, 
81 Stat. 602, 605 (1967). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2). 
HUN-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:15 PM 
1048 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
litical subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality 
of a State.”69 
Elsewhere in the statute, the ADEA explicitly grants juris-
diction over claims against employers who violate the Act.70 
The Act provides,  “Any person aggrieved may bring a civil ac-
tion in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or eq-
uitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chap-
ter . . . .”71 Although this provision merely authorizes ADEA 
suits in “any court of competent jurisdiction” and does not spe-
cifically authorize federal court jurisdiction, the ADEA other-
wise incorporates by reference the procedural provisions of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, which in turn specifically authorize 
federal court jurisdiction.72 
Despite the 1974 amendments, however, the federal circuits 
are split as to whether the Act effectively abrogates the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Atascadero “unmis-
takably clear” standard.73 This dispute has most recently been 
addressed by the Eighth Circuit in Humenansky v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Minnesota.74 
III.  HUMENANSKY V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MINNESOTA 
A.  Facts 
Humenansky involved an electron technician who was em-
ployed by the University of Minnesota for twenty-five years be-
fore being laid off.75 The former employee sued the university, 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See § 626(c). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See § 626(b). 
 73. Compare Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1998), Kee-
ton v. University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998), Hurd v. Pittsburg 
State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1997), Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 
77 F.3d 690, 695 (3d Cir. 1996), Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional 
Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1991), Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 
443 (7th Cir. 1990), and Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 701 (1st Cir. 
1983), with Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 
824-25 (8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 
98-1235), and Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998), 
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999). 
 74. 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 75. See Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 958 F. Supp. 439, 
440 (D. Minn. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 
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alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the 
ADEA.76 
Upon the university’s motion for summary judgment, the 
district court dismissed the plaintiff’s action in its entirety, 
holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the employee’s 
ADEA claims against the state employer.77 On appeal, the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss 
the employee’s claims.78 The appellate court held that the 
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity had not been abrogated 
by the ADEA because Congress (1) failed to sufficiently express 
its intent to abrogate state immunity with the ADEA, and (2) 
did not enact the ADEA pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.79 
B.  The Humenansky Court’s Reasoning 
1.  Congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
immunity with the ADEA 
The Eighth Circuit held that Congress failed to adequately 
manifest its intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment for 
ADEA claims.80 In support of its conclusion, the court looked to 
similar language from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
which had been held by the Supreme Court to be insufficient as 
an expression of congressional intent to abrogate.81 Originally, 
neither the FLSA nor the ADEA were intended to apply to 
state employers.82 In 1966, however, Congress attempted to 
provide for FLSA suits against the states by amending the 
definition of “employer” to include certain state agencies.83 De-
spite the change, the Supreme Court held in Employees of the 
 
98-1235). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d 822, 824. 
 78. See id. at 824-28. 
 79. See id. 
 80.  See id. at 825. 
 81. See id. at 824-25. 
 82.  See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 
Stat. 602, 605 (1967); Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 282 (1973) (noting that under “§ 3(d) of 
[FLSA], ‘employer’ was first defined to exclude the United States or any State or politi-
cal subdivision of a State.”). 
 83.  See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 824-25. 
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Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub-
lic Health and Welfare that the Act did not sufficiently express 
an intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity because 
Congress failed to correspondingly amend the statute’s en-
forcement provision—the provision which authorizes suit 
against violators of the act and designates the courts in which 
an action may be brought.84 In other words, despite Congress’s 
reference to the states as possible defendants, the Court re-
fused to deprive the states of their immunity unless Congress 
provided some other indication that their constitutional immu-
nity was swept away.85 
To overturn this decision, Congress amended the FLSA’s 
enforcement provision to allow claims “against any employer 
(including a public agency) in any Federal or State court.”86 A 
number of courts have since held that the 1974 amendments 
express an unmistakably clear intent to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.87 
At the same time Congress amended the FLSA enforcement 
provision to permit suits in federal court against the states, it 
amended the ADEA definition of “employer” to include “a State 
or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumen-
tality of a State.”88 But Congress failed to simultaneously 
amend the enforcement provision of the ADEA; the current 
provision does not expressly provide for federal court suits 
against the states.89 On the other hand, the ADEA does incor-
porate the current FLSA procedures by reference, including the 
FLSA’s extremely clear authorization for federal court jurisdic-
tion over state defendants.90 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that, because the ADEA still does not expressly au-
thorize federal court suits in its own text, Congress has not 
 
 84. See id. at 285. 
 85.  See id. 
 86.  Amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 
Stat. 55, 58 (1974) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1966)). 
 87.  See, e.g., Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1993); Hale v. Ari-
zona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 88. Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 825 
(8th Cir. 1998) (citing Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 74 (codified at 29 U.S.C.§ 
630(b)(2) (1994))), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 98-
1235). 
 89.  See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994)). 
 90.  At 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994), the ADEA incorporates, inter alia, 29 U.S.C. § 
216(b) of the FLSA, which authorizes claims “against any employer (including a public 
agency) in any Federal or State court.” 
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clearly expressed its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from ADEA suits.91 
2.  Congressional authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
immunity 
The Humenansky court also concluded that even if Con-
gress intended to abrogate the states’ immunity to federal court 
ADEA suits, it lacked the authority to do so.92 The overwhelm-
ing majority of courts disagree with the Eighth Circuit.  They 
argue that Congress has the power to deter Fourteenth 
Amendment violations through legislation that prohibits con-
duct which is not itself unconstitutional, so long as the remedy 
is proportional to the injury Congress seeks to prevent.93 The 
majority contends that the ADEA is a proportional remedy be-
cause the Act is “narrowly drawn to protect older citizens from 
arbitrary and capricious action,”94 and, according to the ADEA’s 
legislative history, age discrimination was prevalent at the 
time of its enactment.95 
The Humenansky court rejected this argument, concluding 
that the ADEA does not constitute valid Fourteenth Amend-
ment legislation.96 In reaching this conclusion, the Eighth Cir-
cuit noted several cases in which the Supreme Court refused to 
extend Fourteenth Amendment protections against age dis-
crimination as far as the ADEA does.97 In Massachusetts Board 
of Retirement v. Murgia,98 for example, the Supreme Court up-
 
 91.  See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825. 
 92.  See id. at 827. 
 93.  See, e.g., Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 94.  Id. at 503. 
 95. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)-(b) (1994). 
 96.  See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827. 
 97.  The court explained: 
Age is not a suspect class entitled to a heightened level of equal protection 
scrutiny. . . . In Vance v. Bradley, . . . the Court upheld a federal statute 
mandating that Foreign Service officers retire at age sixty against an equal 
protection challenge, concluding the classification was valid under rational 
basis review.  The Equal Protection Clause applies not only to statutes such 
as those at issue in Murgia and Vance, but also to the day-to-day employment 
decisions of a myriad of state officers and agencies.  But these isolated execu-
tive actions are unconstitutional only if they are the product of intentional 
discrimination that “fail[s] to comport with the requirements of equal protec-
tion.” 
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 98.  427 U.S. 307 (1979). 
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held a police department’s mandatory retirement policy be-
cause it furthered the rational state objective of eliminating 
physically unfit police officers.99 The Court held that age is not 
a suspect class entitled to a heightened level of equal protection 
scrutiny.100 Based on Murgia and similar cases, the Eighth Cir-
cuit reasoned that, “given the many economic and social factors 
that may justify adverse employment action based upon age in 
a particular situation, it seems likely that only a few isolated, 
egregiously irrational instances of age discrimination would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.”101 
In further support of its position, the Eighth Circuit cited 
City of Boerne v. Flores,102 in which the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether Congress exceeded the scope of its 
Section 5 enforcement power in enacting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.103 As explained above, the Supreme Court held 
that the “compelling government interest” and “least restrictive 
means” tests of the RFRA were so restrictive of government ac-
tion that the statute could not have been enacted under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires only a rational basis 
for government action.104 
The Humenansky court concluded that because the ADEA, 
like the RFRA, exceeds the scope of the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Age Act does not fall within Congress’s authority to 
prevent violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 Thus, the 
Eighth Circuit held that the Act fails to meet the authority re-
quirement for abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity.106 
 
 99.  See id. at 317. 
 100.  See id. at 313. 
 101.  Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827 (footnote omitted). 
 102. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 103.  See id. at 512-13. 
 104.  See id. at 512-35. 
 105.  See generally Humenansky, 152 F.3d 822.  Note, however, that the ADEA has 
been upheld as valid under the Commerce Clause. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 
226, 243 (1983). 
 106.  See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827-28.  The Eleventh Circuit is the only other 
circuit to have held that the ADEA does not effectively abrogate the States’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. However, the court arrived at this conclusion with substantial 
disagreement. Of the three judges, only one believed that Congress did not adequately 
express an intent to abrogate immunity, and only one concluded that Congress did not 
have the authority to abrogate immunity with the ADEA.  The third judge argued that 
Congress failed to meet either requirement.  Although the court’s two-to-one vote in 
favor of dismissing the plaintiff’s claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds carried the 
day, the division within the Eleventh Circuit is representative of the discord among the 
circuits regarding both the intent and authority issues. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE HUMENANSKY COURT’S REASONING 
A.  Clarifying the “Unmistakably Clear” Requirement: 
Expressing Congressional Intent to Abrogate State Immunity 
Seven of the nine circuits to address the intent issue have 
either held or stated in dicta that Congress adequately ex-
pressed its intent to abrogate the states’ immunity when it 
amended the ADEA in 1974.107 The Humenansky court’s dis-
agreement with the majority essentially hinges on its interpre-
tation of the “unmistakably clear” standard set forth in Atasca-
dero State Hospital v. Scanlon.108 
By definition, unmistakable language is that “not capable of 
being . . . misunderstood.”109 Similarly, the word “clear” has 
been defined as “free from obscurity or ambiguity: easily un-
derstood: . . . free from doubt.”110 Each word, taken alone, de-
mands an extremely high level of explicitness. When construed 
together, however, the words “intensif[y] the implications” of 
each other, creating an even more demanding standard of clar-
ity.111 The level of clarity required under Atascadero is magni-
fied even further when the phrase “unmistakably clear” is com-
bined with another intent requirement: that the unequivocal 
language be contained within the text of the statute itself.112 
For the purposes of this Note, the combination of these two 
elements will be referred to as the “Atascadero standard” or the 
“unmistakably clear requirement.” 
 
 107.  Compare Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1998), Kee-
ton v. University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998), Hurd v. Pittsburg 
State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1997), Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 
77 F.3d 690, 695 (3d Cir. 1996), Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional 
Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1991), Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 
443 (7th Cir. 1990), and Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 701 (1st Cir. 
1983), with  Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 
824-25 (8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 
98-1235), and  Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998), 
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999). 
 108.  473 U.S. 234, 238, 243 (1985). 
 109.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1294 (10th ed. 1997). 
 110.  Id. at 213. 
 111.  Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1430 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998), 
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999). 
 112.  See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989). 
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1.  A framework for analyzing congressional intent 
The Supreme Court has suggested that legislative history is 
largely irrelevant in determining congressional intent to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment.113 Thus, the Atascadero stan-
dard goes more to the structure of statutory language than to 
the Court’s desire to understand Congress’s intent.114 Con-
ceivably, Congress could produce volumes of legislative history 
regarding its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity through a piece of legislation. But if the text of the statute 
lacked one or more of a few key phrases, the Supreme Court 
would be unlikely to find the statute abrogates sovereign im-
munity. A court may be thoroughly convinced that Congress in-
tended to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity and yet 
conclude that Congress did not express its intent with enough 
force. 
The circuit courts’ treatment of the ADEA provides sub-
stantial evidence that the courts interpret Atascadero as plac-
ing heavy emphasis on the form of would-be abrogation lan-
guage. In Kimel v. State of Florida Board of Regents,115 for 
example, Judge Edmondson stated, 
I do not dispute that some provisions of the ADEA make 
States look like possible defendants in suits alleging viola-
tions of the ADEA. I accept that these provisions could sup-
port an “inference that the States were intended to be subject 
to damages actions for violations of the [ADEA]” [b]ut . . . a 
permissible inference is not “the unequivocal declaration” that 
is required to show Congress’s intent to exercise its powers of 
abrogation.116 
This language suggests that the court indeed may not have 
been as uncertain about Congress’s intent, as much as it was 
uncertain about whether Congress expressed its intent with 
sufficient explicitness.  Given a less stringent standard than 
the “unmistakably clear” requirement, perhaps Edmondson 
and other judges adopting the minority position would have 
readily adopted the inference that the states were intended to 
 
 113.  See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996) (holding that Congress 
may only  abrogate state sovereign immunity “by making its intention unmistakably 
clear in the language of the statute”) (citation omitted). 
 114. See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 228. 
 115.  139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 116.  Id. at 1432 (citations omitted). 
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be subject to ADEA suits in federal court. Under the Atasca-
dero standard, however, Edmondson was only willing to con-
cede that the provisions of the ADEA “could” support this in-
ference.117 Because of this reasoning, the courts are still divided 
as to whether the ADEA meets the Atascadero intent require-
ments, even though Congress amended the ADEA to explicitly 
include the states within the class of potential defendant-
employers, and deleted all provisions which previously ex-
cluded states from the class of defendants.118 
The question of whether the Humenansky court correctly 
applied the Atascadero standard can be most easily addressed 
by analyzing the ADEA in light of a few specific types of statu-
tory provisions that have been held to constitute language suf-
ficient to express intent. Specifically, the case law suggests 
that, for a statute to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, the 
text of the statute generally must either (1) make direct refer-
ence to the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity, or (2) 
specifically refer to the states as defendants within the section 
of the statute that defines the class of potential defendants.119 
If option two is invoked and there is still substantial ambiguity 
as to congressional intent, the courts may also require the text 
to authorize actions against a state within the statute’s en-
forcement provision—the portion of the statute that authorizes 
suits by aggrieved persons and designates the courts in which 
these suits may be brought.120 
 
 117.  See id. 
 118. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1994). 
 119.  See infra Part IV.A.3.  See also, e.g., Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 231.  In Dellmuth, 
despite the fact that the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) contained frequent 
references to state obligations under the Act, the Court stated: 
We cannot agree that the textual provisions on which the Court of Appeals 
relied, or any other provisions of the EHA, demonstrate with unmistakable 
clarity that Congress intended to abrogate the States’ immunity from suit.  
The EHA makes no reference whatsoever to either the Eleventh Amendment 
or the States’ sovereign immunity.  Nor does any provision cited by the Court 
of Appeals address abrogation in even oblique terms, much less with the clar-
ity Atascadero requires. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 120. In Employees of the Department of Public Health and Welfare v. Department 
of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), for example, the Court recognized 
that the states were included within the FLSA’s class of defendants. But other lan-
guage provided that a federal officer may sue the state on behalf of aggrieved individu-
als. The court reasoned that Congress might have included the states as defendants 
only so that they could be sued by the federal officer. Such an authorization for suit 
against the states would not require abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment because 
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2.  Using “magic words” to express congressional intent 
Although use of the word “immunity” or the phrase “Elev-
enth Amendment” would provide the clearest textual indication 
of congressional intent to contravene state immunity, Congress 
is not required to use any certain “magic words.”121 By holding 
Congress to the Atascadero standard, the Supreme Court has 
come close to requiring specific immunity-abrogating language.  
In fact, the Court stated in Dellmuth v. Muth122 that anything 
 
federal court suits against the state by the federal government are not prohibited by 
the amendment.  See id. at 285. 
  On the other hand, the possibility that a private citizen could sue a state de-
fendant in state court has not appeared to generate as much concern for the Supreme 
Court regarding the meaning of statutory language that includes the states within a 
class of defendants. Federal law claims can generally be brought in either federal or 
state court. Since the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit state court suits against 
the states, the Supreme Court could arguably find ambiguity as to congressional intent 
to abrogate sovereign immunity whenever a statute refers to the states as defendants 
but does not expressly refer to sovereign immunity or the Eleventh Amendment. Au-
thorizing suits by private citizens against states would not require abrogation of the 
Eleventh Amendment because individuals could still sue a state in state court. Thus, 
the states-as-defendants language would not be rendered meaningless whether or not 
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment was intended. 
 121.  Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1433 n.15 (11th Cir. 1998), 
cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999). In concluding that the ADEA fails to adequately 
express congressional intent to abrogate immunity, Judge Edmonson stated in a foot-
note, 
I do not say that certain magic words must be used to abrogate immunity.  I 
accept that Congress could unmistakably signal abrogation of immunity in a 
variety of ways, and we write no general rules today.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1) (where Title VII speaks of suits by aggrieved persons against “a gov-
ernment, governmental agency, or political subdivision” while discussing 
suits in federal district courts). 
Id.  But compare Judge Hatchett’s dissenting opinion: 
  Although Judge Edmondson states that we do not require Congress to 
use any “magic words” to abrogate effectively the states’ sovereign immunity, 
and that Congress may “unmistakably signal abrogation of immunity in a va-
riety of ways,” I believe that his opinion, in essence, is requiring exactly that.  
If Congress has not sufficiently expressed its intent to abrogate the states’ 
immunity through including “States” in the definition of “employer” in the 
ADEA, after this decision, I cannot imagine in what other “variety of ways” 
Congress can signal the abrogation of the states’ immunity, other than 
through the use of “magic words.”  The Court in Seminole Tribe did not re-
quire that Congress use any talismanic language to express its intent to ab-
rogate, and could easily have done so.  As I do not believe that Seminole Tribe 
requires Congress to use any particular words to express effectively its intent 
to abrogate the states’ immunity, and because I believe that Congress’s intent 
is clear in the language of the ADEA, I conclude that the first criterion of 
Seminole Tribe is satisfied. 
 122.  491 U.S. 223 (1989). 
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short of “perfect confidence that Congress in fact intended to 
abrogate sovereign immunity . . . will not suffice . . . .”123 How-
ever, by not requiring an explicit reference to the “Eleventh 
Amendment” or “sovereign immunity,” the Supreme Court ac-
tually stops short of requiring “perfect” clarity, as evidenced by 
the fact that that there is almost always substantial confusion 
regarding congressional intent whenever a statute does not 
employ these key words.124 
3. Comparison of the ADEA with other statutes’ intent language 
By examining the language from statutes that have already 
been held to either lack or possess a sufficient manifestation of 
congressional intent to abrogate immunity, the following sec-
tion will attempt to alleviate some of this confusion by articu-
lating the requirements of the “unmistakably clear” rule.  This 
section will also demonstrate that the Humenansky court erred 
in concluding that the ADEA lacks sufficient manifestation of 
congressional intent to abrogate state immunity. 
 a.  Statutes that clearly do not express congressional intent 
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.   
      (1) The Rehabilitation Act.  The Rehabilitation Act 
provides a remedy for federal employees who allege 
employment discrimination on the basis of their disabilities.125 
The statute provides in part that, 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, 
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 
 
 123.  Id. at 231. 
 124. See infra Part IV.A.3.  See also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), in 
which four justices dissented from the majority’s conclusion that the Education of the 
Handicapped Act did not abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, where the 
EHA was replete with references to the states and their obligations to aggrieved par-
ties, but made no direct reference to Eleventh Amendment immunity or federal court 
jurisdiction.  Also note that, in Kimel, the Eleventh Circuit held that the ADEA does 
not effectively abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. But only one judge 
concluded that Congress failed to adequately express an intent to abrogate immunity, 
and only one concluded that Congress did not have the authority to abrogate immunity 
with the ADEA, while the third member of the panel argued that Congress failed to 
meet either requirement.  See 139 F.3d 1426, 1433, 1444, 1449. 
 125.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). 
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participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance or under any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States 
Postal Service.126 
Before 1986, the Rehabilitation Act provided for remedies 
against “any recipient of Federal assistance.”127 In Atascadero 
State Hospital v. Scanlon, the plaintiff argued that the word 
“any” made this provision broad enough to include state “re-
cipients.”128 Therefore, the plaintiff reasoned, the states were 
not immune to claims arising under this Act.129 The Supreme 
Court expressly rejected this argument, holding that a “general 
authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of un-
equivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment.”130 In other words, even if the language of a 
statute allows or seems to require jurisdiction,  the statute will 
not effectively abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity absent 
a more deliberate expression of congressional intent to do so.131 
     (2) Other “general authorization”  statutes.  Welch v. 
Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation132 
involved a state employee who was injured while working on a 
ferry dock owned by the Texas transportation department.133 
The employee sued the state pursuant to the Jones Act, which 
provides, “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the 
course of his employment may . . . maintain an action for dam-
ages” in federal court.134 Addressing the state’s assertion of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Supreme Court applied 
the Atascadero standard and held that Congress had not un-
equivocally expressed its intention to contravene the Eleventh 
Amendment in unmistakably clear language within the Jones 
Act.135 In the plurality opinion, Justice Powell reiterated that a 
“general authorization for suit in federal court” does not consti-
 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1973) (amended 1986). 
 128.  See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 245 (1985). 
 129.  See id. 
 130.  Id. at 246. 
 131.  See id. 
 132.  483 U.S. 468 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
 133.  See id. at 470-71. 
 134.  46 U.S.C. § 688 (a) (1994). 
 135.  See Welch, 483 U.S. at 475. 
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tute adequate abrogation language.136 
Similarly, the word “whoever” in a patent statute and the 
word “anyone” in a copyright statute have been held to be in-
sufficient designations of the states as potential defendants for 
purposes of abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity.137 The 
federal patent statute reads in pertinent part: “[W]hoever with-
out authority makes, uses, or offers to sell, or sells any pat-
ented invention . . . infringes the patent.”138 The copyright stat-
ute provides, “Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights 
of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright.”139 In 
each case, the circuit courts found the statutory language to 
contain nothing more than a general authorization for suit in 
federal court. For example, in Chew v. California, the court did 
not find “the requisite unmistakable language of congressional 
intent necessary to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity.”140 
The patent and copyright statutes, the pre-1986 Rehabilita-
tion Act, and the Jones Act are clear examples of legislation 
that fails to meet the Atascadero standard. Comparing the 
ADEA with these statutes sheds little light on the Humenansky 
holding because the language of the ADEA is much more ex-
plicit in designating states as potential defendants. Neverthe-
less, these “general authorization” statutes illustrate one ex-
treme of the clarity spectrum. 
 b.  Statutes that clearly express congressional intent to 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
     (1) The Americans with Disabilities Act. Congress en-
acted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in part be-
cause it found that discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities had become a pervasive problem in the United States, 
and that, “unlike individuals who have experienced discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or 
age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the 
basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress 
 
 136.  Id. at 476 (citation omitted). 
 137.  See BV Eng’g v. U.C.L.A., 858 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 138.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 139.  17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 140.  Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 334 (Fed. Cir. 1990), superceded by statute 
as stated in Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
HUN-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:15 PM 
1060 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
such discrimination.”141 The ADA provides remedies for indi-
viduals discriminated against in employment and other situa-
tions because of their disabilities.142 
Whereas the general authorization statutes described above 
are clearly inadequate expressions of intent under the Atasca-
dero standard, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is 
blatantly clear in expressing intent, and falls on the other end 
of the spectrum. The ADA reads, “A State shall not be immune 
under the Eleventh Amendment . . . from suit in Federal court 
for a violation” of the ADA.143 
     (2) The amended Rehabilitation Act.  The present version 
of the Rehabilitation Act is equally explicit. In response to the 
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Atascadero that the statute did 
not contain an unequivocal expression of congressional intent 
to abrogate state immunity,144 Congress amended the Rehabili-
tation Act to include abrogation language similar to that of the 
ADA.  The amended statute provides, “[A] State shall not be 
immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States . . . for a violation of [the Rehabilitation 
Act].”145 
The explicit abrogation language of the ADA and the 
amended Rehabilitation Act is arguably the only type of lan-
guage that would measure up to the Atascadero standard in all 
cases. Although the Supreme Court has never specifically re-
quired the use of precise language to abrogate immunity, per-
haps it should. Given the Supreme Court’s insistence that ab-
rogation language be expressed with such extreme clarity, it 
would be better to take this final step and require a direct ref-
erence to sovereign immunity or the Eleventh Amendment as a 
sort of ritualistic signal of congressional intent to abrogate 
state immunity. By not taking this final step, and yet requiring 
unmistakable language of intent within a statute’s text, the 
Supreme Court leaves room for confusion where a statute’s ex-
pression of congressional intent lies somewhere between the 
perfect clarity of the ADA and the clearly inadequate general 
authorizations for suit provided by statutes like the Jones Act. 
Because the ADEA’s abrogation language falls somewhere in 
 
 141. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (1994). 
 142. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994). 
 143.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994). 
 144.  See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985). 
 145.  42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994). 
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this gray area, a comparison of the ADEA with other statutes 
lacking explicit references to the Eleventh Amendment pro-
vides insight into the issue of whether the Age Act complies 
with the unmistakably clear rule. 
 c.  Statutes in the gray area of congressional expression of 
intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
     (1)  The Education of the Handicapped Act.  The Educa-
tion of the Handicapped Act (EHA) enacts a system of provid-
ing handicapped children with free public education appropri-
ate for their individual needs.146 The statute provides access to 
the courts through a cause of action for parties aggrieved by 
the administrative proceedings at which decisions regarding 
the allocation of EHA funds are made.147 Although the EHA al-
lows for judicial review on behalf of these “aggrieved parties,” it 
lacks any direct reference to sovereign immunity or the Elev-
enth Amendment. Unlike the “general authorization” statutes, 
however, the EHA contains frequent references to the states, 
and outlines the states’ and local authorities’ roles in providing 
education for handicapped children.148 Nevertheless, in Dell-
muth v. Muth, a sharply divided Supreme Court found the 
EHA to lack a sufficient expression of intent.149 The Court 
stated, 
We recognize that the EHA’s frequent reference to the States, 
and its delineation of the States’ important role in securing an 
appropriate education for handicapped children, make the 
States, along with local agencies, logical defendants in suits 
alleging violations of the EHA.  This statutory structure lends 
force to the inference that the States were intended to be sub-
ject to damages actions for violations of the EHA. But such a 
permissible inference, whatever its logical force, would re-
main just that: a permissible inference. It would not be the 
unequivocal declaration which, we reaffirm today, is neces-
sary before we will determine that Congress intended to exer-
cise its powers of abrogation.150 
Thus, we learn from Dellmuth that statutes without specific 
 
 146.  See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 225 (1989). 
 147.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) and (4)(1994). 
 148.  See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 232. 
 149. See id. at 232. 
 150.  Id. 
HUN-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:15 PM 
1062 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
reference to sovereign immunity must not only refer to the 
states, but must refer to the states in the right place. At least 
according to the Dellmuth majority, the statute must “speak to 
what parties are subject to suit” in the narrow portion of the 
text which defines these parties, regardless of the number of 
references to, or obligations imposed on, a state in other por-
tions of the statute.151 On the other hand, the fact that four jus-
tices found ample evidence of intent within the EHA suggests 
that this requirement should be taken with a grain of salt. 
The ADEA’s intent language is superior to the EHA’s be-
cause the ADEA refers to the states in the section that defines 
the class of potential defendants in age discrimination cases.152 
Specifically, the statute defines “employer” to include “a State 
or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumen-
tality of a State or a political subdivision of a State.”153 
But the existence of such language is not necessarily dispo-
sitive. If a federal statute prohibits state court jurisdiction, but 
includes the states within the defendant class, the states-as-
defendants language is likely to be viewed as substantial evi-
dence of congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. 
Otherwise, the inclusion of states as defendants would be ren-
dered meaningless. In most federal statutes, however, Con-
gress authorizes concurrent jurisdiction. As to these statutes, 
the fact that a state may be sued under the statute does not 
necessarily suggest that Congress intended to abrogate sover-
eign immunity because the Eleventh Amendment does not pro-
hibit private suits against a state in state court. 
Nevertheless, the existence or absence of references to the 
states as potential defendants is a substantial factor in the 
courts’ analysis of congressional intent, regardless of whether 
the statute at issue authorizes suit in both state and federal 
court. 
     (2) CERCLA.  The Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA” or “ Su-
perfund Act”) imposes liability on those who are responsible for 
generating hazardous waste.154 The Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act (SARA) amends and clarifies 
 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994). 
 153.  Id. 
 154. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994). 
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CERCLA.155 On the same day that the Supreme Court decided 
Dellmuth, the Court found CERCLA, as amended by SARA, to 
contain sufficient language of intent because this act, unlike 
the EHA, does refer to the states within the portion of text that 
defines potential defendants.156 
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether CERCLA, as amended by SARA, 
“permits a suit for monetary damages against a State in federal 
court and, if so, whether Congress has the authority to create 
such a cause of action when legislating pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause.”157 The Court answered both questions affirma-
tively.158 Although the Court’s holding as to the authority issue 
was later overruled in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,159 its analysis 
of the intent issue is still relevant for the purpose of interpret-
ing the “unmistakably clear” rule. 
“Persons” and “owners or operators” are listed among those 
who may be liable under CERCLA.160 The definition of “per-
sons” specifically includes the “States.” SARA excludes states 
that have “acquired ownership or control involuntarily” from 
the definition of “owners or operators.”161 The Act specifies, 
however, that this exclusion  
shall not apply to any State or local government which has 
caused or contributed to the release . . . of a hazardous sub-
stance . . . , and such a State or local government shall be sub-
ject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and 
to the same extent, both procedurally and substantively, as 
any nongovernmental entity.162 
The Union Gas Court held that these provisions conveyed con-
gressional intent to abrogate state immunity with unmistak-
able clarity, because, unlike the EHA, CERCLA and SARA not 
only impose obligations on the states, they also refer to the 
states in the section which defines the potential defendants.163 
 
 155.  See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
 156.  See  Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
 157. Id. at 5. 
 158.  See id. 
 159.  517 U.S. 44, 66 (1996). 
 160.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). 
 161.  Id. § 9601(20)(D). 
 162.  Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 8 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D)). 
 163. See id.  The Court stated, “[t]he express inclusion of States within the stat-
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     (3) The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In another case, 
however, the Supreme Court found the abrogation language of 
the FLSA (which regulates wages, hours, and other employ-
ment-related concerns)164 to be insufficient,165 despite the fact 
that Congress amended the original definition of “employer” to 
include state and local agencies. 
In Employees of the Department of Public Health and Wel-
fare v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, the Court in-
validated Congress’s attempt to abrogate sovereign immunity 
with its 1966 amendments to the FLSA because Congress 
failed to also amend the statute’s enforcement provision to pro-
vide for federal court actions against the states.166 Although 
states were specifically included within the class of potential 
defendants, the statute’s enforcement clause provided only 
generally for private suits by the “employee” against the “em-
ployer” to recover unpaid compensation “in any court of compe-
tent jurisdiction.”167 The Court stated it would “be surprising . . 
. to infer that Congress deprived Missouri of her constitutional 
immunity without changing the [enforcement provision] under 
which she could not be sued or indicating in some way by clear 
language that the constitutional immunity was swept away.”168 
To overturn the ruling, Congress amended the enforcement 
provision again in 1974 to authorize private suits “against any 
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State 
court.”169 A number of circuits have since held that the 1974 
amendments reflect an unmistakably clear intent to abrogate 
sovereign immunity.170 
     (4)  Comparison of the ADEA with the FLSA. The ADEA’s 
enforcement provision fails to specifically authorize federal 
court suits against the states. The amendments to the ADEA 
 
ute’s definition of ‘persons,’ and the plain statement that States are to be considered 
‘owners or operators’. . . together convey a message of unmistakable clarity: Congress 
intended that States be liable along with everyone else for cleanup costs recoverable 
under CERCLA.”  Id. 
 164.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994). 
 165.  See Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. 
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973). 
 166.  See id. at 283-85. 
 167.  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§  4, 7, 
81 Stat. 602 (1967). 
 168.  Employees, 411 U.S. at 285. 
 169.  29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994). 
 170. See, e.g., Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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parallel those of the FLSA. Both the ADEA and the FLSA were 
originally intended to exclude states from their definitions of 
defendant-employers, and Congress subsequently amended 
both statutes to include states within these definitions.171 A 
major difference, however, is that the FLSA’s enforcement pro-
vision was amended to permit suits “against any employer (in-
cluding a public agency) in any federal or State court,”172 and 
the ADEA’s enforcement provision, to this day, provides only a 
general authorization for ADEA suits: “Any person aggrieved 
may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion . . . .”173 
Under Employees, Congress’s failure to amend the ADEA’s 
enforcement provision could arguably compel a finding that the 
language was insufficient as a manifestation of intent to abro-
gate. The Humenansky court reasoned, “[i]f Congress intended 
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for the ADEA as 
well as the FLSA, and recognized that Employees required that 
intent to abrogate be reflected by amending the enforcement 
provisions, . . . [Congress would have amended] the ADEA pro-
vision that most directly addresses the question of federal court 
jurisdiction.”174 
          (a) ADEA and FLSA enforcement provision. The 
ADEA incorporates the FLSA’s enforcement provision, which 
authorizes federal court jurisdiction against state employers. 
However, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) provides that the ADEA “shall be 
enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and proce-
dures provided in” the FLSA.175 The FLSA’s 1974 enforcement 
provision, which specifically allows suits by private parties 
against public agencies in federal court, is one of the sections 
that is cross-referenced in the ADEA.176 Therefore, because 
Congress corrected the deficient language of the FLSA, and be-
cause the corrected language of the FLSA is incorporated by 
reference in the Age Act, the ADEA’s immunity-abrogating 
language was corrected by proxy. 
 
 171.  See Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 
824-25 (8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 
98-1235). 
 172.  Amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 
Stat. 55, 61 (1974). 
 173.  29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1994). 
 174. Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825. 
 175.  29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). 
 176.  See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825. 
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Admittedly, the Supreme Court held in Atascadero that the 
intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment must be ex-
pressed within the unmistakable language of the statute it-
self.177 In light of this requirement, the Humenansky court con-
cluded that the ADEA’s incorporation of the FLSA’s immunity-
abrogating language is insufficient. The court held that the 
ADEA still lacks sufficient language of intent because it con-
tains no unmistakably clear expression of intent within its own 
text.178 
However, by ignoring the cross-referenced FLSA provisions 
in its analysis of the ADEA’s abrogation language, the Eighth 
Circuit takes the Atascadero standard too far. In Union Gas, 
the Supreme Court clearly considered the language of 
CERCLA’s companion statute—SARA—in determining 
whether CERCLA abrogated the Eleventh Amendment.179 Re-
call that SARA, which supplements CERCLA, provides that a 
“State or local government which has caused or contributed to 
the release . . . of a hazardous substance . . . , and such a State 
or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this 
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both pro-
cedurally and substantively as any nongovernmental entity.”180 
If the statute had not contained this language, the Court would 
not likely have held that CERCLA abrogates the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
The relationship between CERCLA and SARA is similar to 
that of the ADEA and the FLSA.  The provisions of the FLSA 
are intended to supplement and clarify the ADEA.  The ADEA 
incorporates, inter alia, the FLSA provision,181 which author-
izes claims “against any employer (including a public agency) 
in any Federal or State court.”182 Under the approach in Union 
Gas, this language should not be ignored. Although Atascadero 
requires Congress to manifest its intent to abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment with language within the statute itself,183 
Union Gas suggests that language within statutes that are in-
tertwined with the original statute may also be considered for 
 
 177.  See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). 
 178.  See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825. 
 179.  See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
 180.  42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) & (35)(D) (1994). 
 181.  See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 182.  Id. 
 183. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). 
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the purpose of analyzing congressional intent. Because the 
Humenansky court discounted the relevance of the incorpora-
tion of the FLSA provision in its analysis of the ADEA’s intent 
language, it wrongly concluded that the Age Act fails to meet 
the intent requirement for abrogating the Eleventh Amend-
ment. 
          (b)  The ADEA as distinguishable from the pre-1974 
FLSA.  As noted, the pre-1974, pre-Employees FLSA specifi-
cally included the states within its definition of potentially li-
able employers.184 But the Supreme Court concluded that this 
provision was not a clear enough expression of congressional 
intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.185 
 The Court’s uncertainty regarding Congress’s intent was 
largely based on the fact that other language in the statute al-
lowed for the possibility that the Eleventh Amendment could 
remain in full force even if a state was sued in federal court 
under the FLSA.186 The Court reasoned: if Congress did not in-
tend to allow private individuals to sue state employers for 
FLSA violations, but instead intended to allow a federal officer 
to sue violating states in behalf of private individuals, the 
Eleventh Amendment would not necessarily be compromised 
by the statute.187 Thus, Congress’s intent to abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment could not be ascertained simply because it 
provided for suits against state employers in the 1966 version 
of the FLSA.188 The Court argued, 
By holding that Congress did not lift the sovereign immunity 
of the States under the FLSA, we do not make the extension 
of coverage to state employees meaningless.  Section 16(c) 
gives the Secretary of Labor authority to bring suit for unpaid 
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under the 
FLSA. Once the Secretary acts under § 16(c), the right of any 
employee . . . to sue under § 16(b) terminates. Section 17 gives 
the Secretary power to seek to enjoin violations of the Act and 
to obtain restitution in behalf of employees.  Sections 16 and 
17 suggest that since private enforcement of the Act was not a 
paramount objective, disallowance of suits by state employees 
 
 184. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 4, 
7, 81 Stat. 602, 603-05 (1967). 
 185.  See Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. 
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973). 
 186.  See id. at 285-86. 
 187.  See id. 
 188.  See id. 
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and remitting them to relief through the Secretary of Labor 
may explain why Congress was silent as to waiver of sover-
eign immunity of the States. For suits by the United States 
against a State are not barred by the Constitution.189 
The ADEA is distinguishable from the FLSA because the 
ADEA contains no such provisions within its own text. Nor is 
there any other ambiguous language in the ADEA which sug-
gests that Congress included the states within the “employer” 
definition for any reason other than to abrogate the states sov-
ereign immunity. 
Although the Supreme Court suggested in Employees that 
the intent language of the 1966 FLSA was inadequate because 
it failed to refer to the states in the enforcement provision, the 
Court also insinuated that explicit enforcement provision lan-
guage was not necessarily a prerequisite to Eleventh Amend-
ment abrogation.190 The Court stated that it would not deprive 
the states of their immunity unless Congress changed the en-
forcement provision and “indicat[ed] in some way by clear lan-
guage that the constitutional immunity was swept away.”191 
Thus, the Court left the door open to the possibility that con-
gressional intent could be expressed clearly through other 
means, and stopped short of requiring a reference to the states 
in the enforcement provision. 
Indeed, if the procedures relating to the Secretary’s power 
to intervene for private employees had not existed in the FLSA, 
the Court would have been less likely to find the statute am-
biguous as to Congress’s intent to abrogate immunity—
especially in light of the fact that the 1966 FLSA clearly identi-
fied the states as potentially liable employers.192 Thus, because 
the text of the ADEA does not contain the Secretary of Labor 
intervention provisions that gave rise to the Court’s uncer-
 
 189.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 190.  See id. at 285. 
 191.  Id.  Note that the Court briefly acknowledged that even without the Secre-
tary intervention procedures, the states-as-defendants provision would not necessarily 
have become obsolete absent Eleventh Amendment abrogation.  Justice Douglas stated, 
The argument is that if we deny this direct federal court remedy, we in effect 
are recognizing that there is a right without any remedy.  Section 16(b), how-
ever, authorizes employee suits in “any court of competent jurisdiction.”  Ar-
guably, that permits suit in the [state] courts but that is a question we need 
not reach. 
Id. at 287. 
 192.  See id. at 285-86. 
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tainty in the first place, the holding in Employees cannot easily 
be used to prove that the Supreme Court would find the 
ADEA’s intent language inadequate. The intent language of 
the ADEA is simply not as ambiguous as that of the 1966 
FLSA. 
          (c) The ADEA adopts the Secretary of Labor provisions 
and FLSA enforcement provisions by reference. The ADEA 
adopts the FLSA’s Secretary of Labor procedures by reference. 
But it does so in the same provision that incorporates the 
FLSA’s amended enforcement provision—the very provision 
which cured the prior ambiguity caused by the Secretary of La-
bor procedures.193 It would be incongruous to ignore the 
ADEA’s reference to the FLSA enforcement provision for the 
purpose of showing that the Age Act lacks textual clarity, while 
simultaneously emphasizing other cross-referenced procedures 
in order to show that the ambiguity regarding the pre-amended 
FLSA also exists in the ADEA. 
4.  Final analysis of the ADEA’s compliance with the intent 
requirement 
Except as to statutes that specifically use the phrases 
“Eleventh Amendment” or “sovereign immunity,” to abrogate 
state immunity, there has been much disagreement among the 
federal circuits and Supreme Court justices regarding the types 
of provisions that do and do not constitute unmistakably clear 
expressions of congressional intent to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment.194 Examination of Supreme Court cases that ad-
dress the sufficiency of various would-be abrogation provisions 
provides the clearest available picture of the types of provisions 
that meet the Atascadero standard. 
To contravene state immunity, a statute must contain more 
than a general authorization for suit against a class of unspeci-
fied defendants.195 Furthermore, if the abrogation language 
does not explicitly mention the Eleventh Amendment or sover-
eign immunity, it must usually refer to the states specifically in 
the portion of the statute which defines the class of potential 
 
 193.  See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). 
 194.  See supra Part IV.A.  Also compare, for example, the conflicting opinions of 
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 231 (1989), and Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 
F.3d 1426, 1429 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999). 
 195.  See supra Part IV.A.3.a; see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 
234, 246 (1985). 
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defendants.196 But even where states were included within the 
defendant class, the Supreme Court, in one case, required fur-
ther reference to the states within the statute’s enforcement 
provisions.197 However, this additional hurdle is likely to only 
be imposed where the statute creates substantial ambiguity re-
garding Eleventh Amendment immunity even in light of refer-
ences to the states as defendants.198 
The Atascadero standard, in itself, establishes a highly de-
manding standard of congressional expression, but the Hu-
menansky court applied the Atascadero standard to the ADEA 
even more stringently than the test has been applied in any 
Supreme Court decision. Although the ADEA falls short of ex-
plicitly stating that the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity 
is abrogated, it contains an unequivocal expression of Con-
gress’s intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. By ex-
pressly including the states within the class of potential ADEA 
defendants, Congress “could not have made its desire to over-
ride the states’ sovereign immunity [any] clearer.”199 Because 
the ADEA (1) already has a textual expression of its intent to 
subject the states to private suits, (2) contains no language con-
tradictory to this expression of intent, and (3) incorporates the 
FLSA procedures which specifically provide for suits against 
public employers in federal court, the Humenansky court erred 
in demanding that the ADEA’s abrogation language possess a 
 
 196.  See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 232. 
 197.  See Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. 
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 283-85 (1973). 
 198.  See id. In Employees, the court held that the 1966 FLSA contained no suffi-
cient manifestation of intent to abrogate.  The court  reasoned that “disallowance of 
suits by state employees and remitting them to relief through the Secretary of Labor 
may explain why Congress was silent as to waiver of sovereign immunity of the States. 
For suits by the United States against a State are not barred by the Constitution.”  Id. 
at 286. 
  The Court’s uncertainty as to congressional intent did not seem to arise from 
the fact that federal claims can be brought in state court. Since federal law claims can 
generally be brought in either federal or state court, and since the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not prohibit suits against the states in state court, the Supreme Court could 
conceivably find ambiguity in the abrogation language of most statutes that refer to 
state defendants but do not expressly refer to sovereign immunity or the Eleventh 
Amendment.  Authorizing suits by private citizens against the states would not require 
abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment because individuals could still sue a state in 
state court. Thus, the states-as-defendants language would not be rendered meaning-
less in the absence of Eleventh Amendment abrogation. 
 199.  Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1435 (quoting Davidson v. Board of Governors of State 
Colleges & Univ. for W. Ill. Univ., 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
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textual (rather than cross-referenced) enforcement provision 
that authorizes suits in federal court against the states. 
B.  Questioning Congressional Authority to Abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity 
The Humenansky court also incorrectly concluded that the 
ADEA fails to meet the authority prong of Eleventh Amend-
ment abrogation. To strip the states of their sovereign immu-
nity to federal court suits, Congress must manifest an unmis-
takably clear intent to do so, and enact the relevant legislation 
pursuant to the proper authority—Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.200 If faced with the authority issue, the Supreme 
Court should reject the Humenansky court’s conclusion that the 
ADEA was not enacted under a proper exercise of Fourteenth 
Amendment authority. 
1.  Testing the validity of Fourteenth Amendment legislation 
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,201 the Supreme Court reiterated 
the three-part test for determining whether Congress appro-
priately enacted certain legislation under its Fourteenth 
Amendment, Section 5 enforcement power.  First, a court must 
determine whether a statute “may be regarded as an enact-
ment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.”202 Second, a court 
must determine whether the statute “is plainly adapted” to en-
force the Equal Protection Clause.203 Third, a court must de-
termine whether the statute is consistent with, and “not pro-
hibited by . . . ‘the letter and spirit of the Constitution.’ ”204 
“Recently, the Supreme Court supplemented the [Katzen-
bach] analysis by directing courts to examine whether the stat-
ute creates new constitutional rights through legislation or 
only deters and remedies constitutional violations.”205 In 
Boerne, the Supreme Court applied this expanded test in its 
 
 200.  See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
 201.  384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 202.  Id. at 651. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 830 
(8th Cir. 1998) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)), petition for 
cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 98-1235). 
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analysis of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.206 The 
RFRA prohibited government interference with an individual’s 
exercise of religion unless the interference was in “furtherance 
of a compelling governmental interest, and [was] the least re-
strictive means of furthering that . . . interest.”207 The Supreme 
Court held that, by enacting the RFRA, Congress created sub-
stantive Constitutional law, thereby exceeding its Section 5 
power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.208 The Court emphasized the fact that Section 5 does not 
give Congress authority to determine what constitutes a consti-
tutional violation.209 
2.  Limits to congressional power to create rights beyond 
constitutionally-created rights 
As the Humenansky court acknowledged, the Section 5 en-
forcement power does include the authority to create some 
rights that exceed constitutionally-guaranteed rights.210 For 
example, in order to combat racial discrimination in voting, the 
Supreme Court sustained provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
which prohibited literacy tests from being administered as a 
prerequisite to voting rights.211 However, while sustaining 
these provisions “despite the facial constitutionality of the 
tests,” the Court explained that such extensions of rights can-
not be out of proportion to their purported remedial or preven-
tative objective.212 
In contrast to its decision regarding the Voting Rights Act, 
the United States Supreme Court held in Boerne that the 
RFRA, with its “compelling government interest” and “least re-
strictive means” requirements, was out of proportion to Con-
gress’s object of prohibiting religious discrimination.213 The Su-
preme Court also held that the RFRA contradicted principles of 
federal-state separation and balance of powers by prohibiting 
state laws that place incidental burdens on religion that are 
 
 206.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507 (1997). 
 207.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994). 
 208.  See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532-37. 
 209.  See id. 
 210.  See id. 
 211.  See id. at 518. 
 212.  Id. at 532-37. 
 213.  See id. 
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not animus or hostility based.214 
Applying Boerne, the Humenansky court concluded that the 
ADEA does not constitute valid Fourteenth Amendment legis-
lation.215 The court argued that age is not a protected class that 
rises to the level of judicially-recognized classes, and that, by 
restricting nearly all age-discrimination, the ADEA exceeds the 
protections offered by the Fourteenth Amendment.216 
3.  The constitutionality of age discrimination 
The Humenansky court noted the Supreme Court has up-
held employment policies that set mandatory retirement 
ages,217 and that Congress itself has enacted mandatory re-
tirement legislation which would arguably violate its own Age 
Discrimination Act.218 Employment decisions, the Eighth Cir-
cuit argued, are only unconstitutional if they are the product of 
intentional discrimination that fails to comport with the re-
quirements of equal protection.219 Employment actions moti-
vated by a rational purpose do not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.220 Judge Loken noted, “[G]iven the many economic and 
social factors that may justify adverse employment action 
based upon age . . . , it seems likely that only a few isolated, 
egregiously irrational instances of age discrimination would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.”221 
Supreme Court dictum addressing this issue lends some 
support to the Eighth Circuit’s position. In EEOC v. Wyo-
ming,222 four dissenting justices concluded that the ADEA could 
not have been enacted under Congress’s Section 5 authority.223 
 
 214.  See id. 
 215.  See Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 826 
(8th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 98-
1235). 
 216.  See id. at 826-28. 
 217.  See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-15 
(1976) (upholding mandatory retirement age for state police officers). 
 218.  See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,  262-63 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (rejecting “the power of Congress to impose the Age Act on the states when Con-
gress, in the same year that the Age Act was extended to the states, passed mandatory 
retirement legislation . . . for law enforcement officers and firefighters”) (citations omit-
ted). 
 219.  See Humenansky,  152 F.3d at 827. 
 220.  See id. 
 221.  Id. (footnote omitted). 
 222.  460 U.S. 226 (1983). 
 223.  See id. at 263. 
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Burger argued, 
There is no hint in the . . . Constitution . . . that every classifi-
cation based on age is outlawed. Yet there is much in the 
Constitution and the relevant Amendments to indicate that 
states retain sovereign powers not expressly surrendered, and 
these surely include the power to choose the employees they 
feel are best able to serve . . . . 
And even were we to assume, arguendo, that Congress could 
redefine the Fourteenth Amendment, I would still reject the 
power of Congress to impose the Age Act on the states when 
Congress, in the same year that the Age Act was extended to 
the states, passed mandatory retirement legislation of its 
own . . . for law enforcement officers and firefighters.224 
The overwhelming majority of federal circuit courts, how-
ever, have rejected these arguments, holding that the ADEA is 
valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation. 
4.  Is the ADEA “plainly adapted” to enforcing the Equal 
Protection Clause? 
Congress’ power to legislate under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment is not limited to legislation that protects 
suspect classifications such as race or gender,225 and the struc-
ture of the ADEA and its legislative history provides substan-
tial evidence that the ADEA was intended to prevent Equal 
Protection Clause violations.226 Congress stated in the pream-
ble to the ADEA: 
(1)  in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older 
workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts 
to retain employment, and especially to regain employ-
ment when displaced from jobs; the setting of arbitrary 
age limits regardless of potential for job performance 
has become a common practice, and certain otherwise 
desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of 
older persons; . . . . 
. . . . 
 
 224.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 225.  See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1437 (11th Cir. 
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999). 
 226. See, e.g., Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 501 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote 
employment of older persons based on their ability 
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination 
in employment; to help employers and workers find 
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age 
on employment.227 
In addition, the legislative history of the 1974 Amendment 
provides evidence that “Congress subsequently established that 
these same conditions existed in the public sector.”228 As Judge 
Bataillon reasoned in the Humenansky dissent, 
[T]he text of the ADEA . . . directly addresse[s] the arbitrary 
discrimination older employees face in the workplace. . . . 
[T]he documented existence of age-based discrimination in 
private and public employment induced Congress to intrude 
not only upon the interests of private employers but also upon 
state interests through the enactment of the 1974 amend-
ments.  In light of the well-documented need for equal protec-
tion of older workers, I believe the ADEA is plainly adapted to 
the end of providing older workers equal protection under the 
law.229 
Furthermore, Boerne does not invalidate the ADEA as 
Fourteenth Amendment legislation because, unlike the RFRA’s 
limitations on governments, the restrictions imposed by the 
ADEA are proportional to the injuries Congress sought to pre-
vent.230 The Act is intended “to prohibit arbitrary age discrimi-
nation in employment.”231 The Act addresses the problem by 
requiring that employment decisions be based on merit.  How-
ever, employers may still use age as a criterion in their em-
ployment decisions if “age is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the 
particular business . . . .”232 Thus, the ADEA is much less re-
 
 227.  29 U.S.C. § 621(a)-(b) (1994). 
 228.  Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees, 141 F.3d 761, 772 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations 
omitted). 
 229.  Humenansky v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 831 
(8th Cir. 1998) (Battaillon, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3504 
(U.S. Feb. 1, 1999) (No. 98-1235). 
 230.  See Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
119 S. Ct. 58 (1998). 
 231.  29 U.S.C. § 621(b). 
 232.  Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1998).  See also West-
ern Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422-23 (1985) (“Unless an employer can 
establish a substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all employees above an age 
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strictive of government action than the RFRA’s “compelling 
government interest” and “least restrictive means” test, and 
does not fail under the proportionality limitation to Congress’s 
Section 5 power articulated in Boerne. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As the history of the Eleventh Amendment illustrates, the 
tide of Eleventh Amendment immunity has ebbed and flowed 
over the past two centuries. Seminole Tribe and Boerne repre-
sent the latest major shift in Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence. Under Seminole Tribe, Congress can no longer abrogate 
sovereign immunity through Commerce Clause legislation, 
leaving Congress’s Section 5 power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the only source of authority by which Congress 
may impinge on the states’ Eleventh Amendment protec-
tions.233 Shortly after Seminole Tribe, Boerne extended the 
Katzenbach analysis, establishing a more stringent test for de-
termining the validity of Fourteenth Amendment legislation.234 
Despite this shift towards broader state immunity, the Su-
preme Court, if faced with the issue, should hold that states 
are not immune from ADEA suits. 
There has been much disagreement regarding the type of 
language that constitutes an “unmistakably clear” expression 
of congressional intent to abrogate immunity. But prior Su-
preme Court decisions regarding the intent issue provide a 
rough framework for analyzing abrogation language. Clearly, a 
general authorization for suit is inadequate as an expression of 
congressional intent. On the other hand, language that refers 
explicitly to the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity 
will usually suffice. If the level of clarity lies somewhere be-
tween these two extremes, abrogation is usually effective if the 
text refers to states or public agencies within the portion of the 
text that defines the class of potential defendants. Under Em-
ployees, Congress may also be required to refer to the states in 
the statute’s enforcement provision, but this requirement is 
likely to be imposed only when language within the statute 
 
lack the qualifications required for the position, the age selected for mandatory retire-
ment less than [seventy] must be an age at which it is highly impractical for the em-
ployer to [ensure] by individual testing that its employees will have the necessary 
qualifications for the job”). 
 233.  See generally Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 234. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-37 (1997). 
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creates substantial ambiguity regarding Congress’s intent de-
spite other references to the states.235 
Not only does the ADEA include the states within the class 
of potential defendants, it incorporates the provision of the 
FLSA which specifically authorizes federal court suits against 
public agencies.  Thus, contrary to the Humenansky court’s 
conclusion, the ADEA effectively expresses Congress’s intent to 
subject the states to suit in federal court. 
The Supreme Court should also reject the Eighth Circuit’s 
position on the authority issue and conclude that Congress en-
acted the ADEA pursuant to the proper immunity-stripping 
authority.  The Age Act is plainly adapted to Congress’s pur-
pose of prohibiting arbitrary employment decisions on the basis 
of age, and, in light of the pervasiveness of this type of dis-
crimination, is not “so ‘sweeping’ that the statute cannot be 
seen as proportional to the evil Congress sought to address.”236 
By taking Boerne too far in its authority analysis, and by 
scrutinizing congressional intent even more rigidly than the 
Atascadero standard requires, the Eighth Circuit erred in hold-
ing that the ADEA does not effectively abrogate the states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from ADEA suits. 
Eric Hunter 
 
 235.  See Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub. 
Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973). 
 236.  Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 1998). 
